Hanri Mostert, SARChI Chair for Mineral Law in Africa, University of Cape Town, Tracy-Lynn Field, Professor of Environmental and Sustainability Law, University of the Witwatersrand
A US-brokered peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda binds the two African nations to a worrying arrangement: one where a country signs away its mineral resources to a superpower in return for opaque assurances of security.
The peace deal, signed in June 2025, aims to end three decades of conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.
A key part of the agreement binds both nations to developing a regional economic integration framework. This arrangement would expand cooperation between the two states, the US government and American investors on “transparent, formalized end-to-end mineral chains”.
Despite its immense mineral wealth, the DRC is among the five poorest countries in the world. It has been seeking US investment in its mineral sector.
The US has in turn touted a potential multi-billion-dollar investment programme to anchor its mineral supply chains in the traumatised and poor territory.
The peace that the June 2025 deal promises, therefore, hinges on chaining mineral supply to the US in exchange for Washington’s powerful – but vaguely formulated – military oversight.
The peace agreement further establishes a joint oversight committee – with representatives from the African Union, Qatar and the US – to receive complaints and resolve disputes between the DRC and Rwanda.
But beyond the joint oversight committee, the peace deal creates no specific security obligations for the US.
The relationship between the DRC and Rwanda has been marred by war and tension since the bloody First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo wars. At the heart of much of this conflict is the DRC’s mineral wealth. It has fuelled competition, exploitation and armed violence.
This latest peace deal introduces a resources-for-security arrangement. Such deals aren’t new in Africa. They first emerged in the early 2000s as resources-for-infrastructure transactions. Here, a foreign state would agree to build economic and social infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, hospitals) in an African state. In exchange, it would get a major stake in a government-owned mining company. Or gain preferential access to the host country’s minerals.
We have studied mineral law and governance in Africa for more than 20 years. The question that emerges now is whether a US-brokered resources-for-security agreement will help the DRC benefit from its resources.
Based on our research on mining, development and sustainability, we believe this is unlikely.
This is because resources-for-security is the latest version of a resource-bartering approach that China and Russia pioneered in countries such as Angola, the Central African Republic and the DRC.
Resource bartering in Africa has eroded the sovereignty and bargaining power of mineral-rich nations such as the DRC and Angola.
Further, resources-for-security deals are less transparent and more complicated than prior resource bartering agreements.
DRC’s security gaps
The DRC is endowed with major deposits of critical minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, manganese and tantalum. These are the building blocks for 21st century technologies: artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, wind energy and military security hardware. Rwanda has less mineral wealth than its neighbour, but is the world’s third-largest producer of tantalum, used in electronics, aerospace and medical devices.
For almost 30 years, minerals have fuelled conflict and severe violence, especially in eastern DRC. Tungsten, tantalum and gold (referred to as 3TG) finance and drive conflict as government forces and an estimated 130 armed groups vie for control over lucrative mining sites. Several reports and studies have implicated the DRC’s neighbours – Rwanda and Uganda – in supporting the illegal extraction of 3TG in this region.
The DRC government has failed to extend security over its vast (2.3 million square kilometres) and diverse territory (109 million people, representing 250 ethnic groups). Limited resources, logistical challenges and corruption have weakened its armed forces.
This context makes the United States’ military backing enormously attractive. But our research shows there are traps.
What states risk losing
Resources-for-infrastructure and resources-for-security deals generally offer African nations short-term stability, financing or global goodwill. However, the costs are often long-term because of an erosion of sovereign control.
Here’s how this happens:
Examples of loss or near-loss of sovereignty from these sorts of deals abound in Africa.
For instance, Angola’s US$2 billion oil-backed loan from China Eximbank in 2004. This was repayable in monthly deliveries of oil, with revenues directed to Chinese-controlled accounts. The loan’s design deprived Angolan authorities of decision-making power over that income stream even before the oil was extracted.
These deals also fragment accountability. They often span multiple ministries (such as defence, mining and trade), avoiding robust oversight or accountability. Fragmentation makes resource sectors vulnerable to elite capture. Powerful insiders can manipulate agreements for private gain.
In the DRC, this has created a violent kleptocracy, where resource wealth is systematically diverted away from popular benefit.
Finally, there is the risk of re-entrenching extractive trauma. Communities displaced for mining and environmental degradation in many countries across Africa illustrate the long-standing harm to livelihoods, health and social cohesion.
These are not new problems. But where extraction is tied to security or infrastructure, such damage risks becoming permanent features, not temporary costs.
What needs to change
Critical minerals are “critical” because they’re hard to mine or substitute. Additionally, their supply chains are strategically vulnerable and politically exposed. Whoever controls these minerals controls the future. Africa must make sure it doesn’t trade that future away.
In a world being reshaped by global interests in critical minerals, African states must not underestimate the strategic value of their mineral resources. They hold considerable leverage.
But leverage only works if it is wielded strategically. This means:
investing in institutional strength and legal capacity to negotiate better deals
demanding local value creation and addition
requiring transparency and parliamentary oversight for minerals-related agreements
refusing deals that bypass human rights, environmental or sovereignty standards.
Africa has the resources. It must hold on to the power they wield.
Hanri Mostert receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa. She is a member of the Expropriation Expert Group and a steering committee member of the International Bar Association's (IBA) Academic Advisory Group (AAG) in the Sector for Energy, Environmental, Resources and Infrastructure Law (SEERIL).
Tracy-Lynn Field receives funding from the Claude Leon Foundation. She is a non-executive director of the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa.
