It's understandable that many Australians might have felt confused when the news broke that Russia might be angling to base their long-range bombers and surveillance planes in the north-eastern reaches of Indonesia.
The defence intelligence publication Janes first broke the story on Tuesday, saying that Moscow had launched an official request to base Russian aircraft at the Manuhua Air Force Base at Biak Numfor in the Indonesian province of Papua.
But why would Moscow — which sits some 9,300 kilometres to the north-west of Jakarta and 11,000 kilometres from Darwin – seek to station its planes on the remote island of Biak?
Isn't it already entangled in its ongoing war in Ukraine?
And what about Indonesia, Australia's strategic partner? Didn't Canberra recently sign a major defence agreement with Jakarta? What incentive would Indonesia have to entertain such proposal?
These are all reasonable questions, but disentangling fact from speculation – and the plausible from the conspiratorial — within the murky confines of this saga is far from easy.
What would Russia gain?
Indonesian officials have since made it clear they have no intention of allowing Russian planes to be based in Papua.
But Russia's ambassador to Indonesia, Sergei Tolchenov, sparked further speculation on Wednesday when he responded to the story by declaring that military cooperation was an "integral part of the intergovernmental relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia."
He did not confirm the claim but notably, he did not deny it either.
Unsurprisingly, the report sparked anxiety in Australia's strategic and defence circles.
But what, exactly, would Russia stand to gain from a military foothold in Indonesia?
To understand Moscow's motivations, it's worth considering distance and geography.
Moscow might be a long way from the Pacific theatre, but Biak Island is much closer — some 1,900 kilometres — to the US military base of Guam. And it's only 1,400 kilometres from Darwin.
As Russia expert Matthew Sussex from the Australian National University points out in The Conversation, Russia's long range military planes can "easily travel over 10,000 kilometres."
"From a base in Indonesia, this would give the Russian air force the ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions during Australian military exercises, gather data on military installations in the Northern Territory (which also host US Marines), and even conduct surveillance on US military activities in Guam," he said.
"Equally, given the closeness of ties between Beijing and Moscow, any Russian intelligence that was gathered could be shared with China," Mr Sussex said.
We've already been given a fleeting glimpse of this picture — in late 2017, Australian pilots and crew were forced to scramble when Russian bombers used Biak as a base for a five-day training and intelligence-gathering mission across the region.
Some analysts argue that a permanent or rotating presence of Russian planes that could monitor (or in a worst case scenario, even strike) Australian and US military assets in this region would present Moscow with plenty of options and opportunities.
What would Australia lose?
It would also present what one former senior Australian official called it a "nightmare scenario" for Australian defence planners who are already grappling with the full implications of China's unprecedented partial circumnavigation of the mainland earlier this year.
Former ASPI head and senior Defence bureaucrat Peter Jennings also sees evidence of collusion between Moscow and Beijing.
"It is very much in China's interests to see Russian strategic bombers an hour's flight from US military bases in Guam," he wrote.
"That's the core strategic interest at play in this issue: how can China, using Russia as a proxy, complicate American military planning in the Pacific?"
Not everyone is convinced by this argument, but they agree that with Russian planes in Indonesia, the "warning time" Australia enjoys to respond would shrink to effectively zero.
Felix Advisory's Dougal Robertson, who is a former intelligence officer for the RAAF, tells the ABC that would be a "challenging" situation for Australia.
"If you're looking at an air base in Papua, it's essentially a two-hour flight time to Darwin," Mr Robertson said.
"So there's essentially no warning time at all for Australia to do anything."
Mr Robertson said while the chances of Russia ever getting basing rights at Biak were probably "unlikely", it was not impossible.
"I think that's why there's been such a strong reaction from Canberra, because it is within the realms of possibility," he said.
"In the short-term, we're more likely to see French aircraft based in Indonesia as France has had a bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement since 2021.
"But 2025 has shown us that nothing's impossible so we may very well see an increase in visits by Russian military aircraft to Indonesian air bases over the next few years."
Base denied — but is that it?
Of course, much of the debate over how Russia might use access to the base in Indonesia sidesteps the question of whether Indonesia is going to give the green light in the first place.
The Albanese government remains adamant that the issue is a non-starter, and that Indonesia has ruled out any prospect of Russian planes being able to use the base for its military aircraft.
As one government source put it earlier this week: "yes, it matters whether or not the Russians asked the question."
"But what matters far more is what the Indonesians say in response."
"And the Indonesians have made it clear that if the question is — 'Can Russia use these bases?' then the answer will be 'no.'"
Not everyone is convinced that's the end of the matter.
The Coalition's campaign spokesman James Paterson suggested he was worried about Russia securing a foothold short of full basing rights.
"I look forward to official confirmation from the Indonesian government that not only will Russian aircraft not be based in Indonesia, but they won't have any sort of visiting or access arrangements at all, because Indonesia is an incredibly important national security partner for Australia" he told Sky News.
Some of the trend lines also don't look promising for Canberra.
This might sound counter-intuitive given Australia has scored some significant wins with Indonesia under its new(ish) President Prabowo Subianto, who signed a new defence cooperation agreement with Australia just six months ago.
But Indonesia's long history of non-alignment means it's never going to take sides with one partner against another.
Jakarta has always maintained a laser-like focus on its own self-interest.
Russia sees opportunity
Australians know that trying to convince Jakarta to cut all ties with Russia in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine is futile.
And given Prabowo's appetite for partners remains both voracious and indiscriminate, it's obvious that Moscow spots an opportunity to make fresh inroads with a president who is eager to expand his international relationships.
There's already a healthy defence industry trade between Jakarta and Moscow, which also held bilateral naval exercises in November last year.
Some Australian officials have even speculated that Russia might now be looking to strike a new bargain with Indonesia.
Prabowo, for example, has made it clear he's very interested in getting Moscow's help to build nuclear power plants, and has an eye on securing cheap Russian oil and gas.
Analyst Evan Laksama from the International Institute of Strategic Studies says he's "sceptical" that Indonesia would agree to trade access to military bases in return for nuclear technology or high-tech Russian military equipment.
"There would be big red lines drawn there, and there would be many people in various departments in Jakarta, and politicians, who would not want to see any foreign bases or basing rights for other powers in Indonesia," he tells the ABC.
But he also points out that major foreign policy decisions are being made more quickly and less deliberatively than they were under Prabowo's predecessors.
And that opens up opportunities for Moscow, which wants to prove it is still a global power — despite being deeply embroiled in the ongoing war in Ukraine.
"If there was such a package with Russia on the table, then the political decision in Jakarta might come down to how much Prabowo wanted it, and not just the objections which you would get from others," says Mr Laksama.
"It's probably unlikely, but the decision would be based on both the mood in Jakarta and momentum behind it."
And that's an unsettling position for Australia to be in, with a neighbour so close and with the stakes so high.
