What the US national security strategy tells us about how Trump views the world

The White House has released its national security strategy, a document put out by every US presidential administration in order to spell out its foreign policy priorities. These documents are legally required to be released by Congress and are typically written by a committee. Still, they bear the president’s signature and usually serve as a distillation of how the current commander in chief views the world.

This latest document is no exception. But perhaps even more so than any previous national security strategy, it reflects a focus on the views and activities of the current president. It touts supposed achievements of the Trump administration in a way that would be more appropriate in a campaign speech. And at numerous points, it lavishes praise on Donald Trump for upending conventional wisdom and setting US foreign policy on a new course.

So what can we learn from this document about how Trump views the world? Three themes stand out. The first is that, contrary to some claims, Trump is not an isolationist. He doesn’t want to pull the US back from foreign entanglements completely. If he did, it would hardly make sense to boast of having brokered eight peace deals or of having damaged Iran’s nuclear programme.

Like more traditional national security strategy documents, the latest one still portrays the US as having a responsibility for global peace and prosperity. But within that broad remit, it has a new set of priorities.

The most striking is the focus on the western hemisphere. Whereas recent administrations have identified the containment of China as their key priority, Trump vows he will “restore American preeminence in the western hemisphere”. Yet the only concrete “threats” the document identifies as originating in the region are drug cartels and flows of irregular migrants.

Viewed from the standpoint of previous administrations, this makes little sense. US foreign policy has usually been concerned mainly with grave security threats, particularly from Russia and China. Drugs and migrants were less important than nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers.

Trump views things differently. From his perspective, dangerous narcotics and migrants who he has previously said are “poisoning the blood” of the US are much more direct threats to the American people. Putting “America First”, to use Trump’s favourite phrase for describing his own foreign policy, means focusing on them.

But this does not mean Trump is isolationist. Protecting the American people, even in the way Trump understands it, means having an active foreign policy.

The second key theme of the document is its attitude towards “civilisation”. In it, Trump has returned to a central aspect of his political rhetoric – that “western civilisation” is under attack from a combination of hostile migrants, spineless liberals and cultural degeneracy. Just as Trump appears to see himself as leading the fightback against these forces in the US, he wants others to do the same.

In passages that have sent shockwaves through Europe’s political establishment, the national security strategy lambasts European governments for allegedly welcoming too many migrants, persecuting far-right political parties and betraying the west’s civilisational heritage.

Again, these are not the words of an isolationist. They are the words of someone who, as I have concluded in my own research, views themselves as the protector of a racially and culturally defined civilisation that covers both the US and Europe.

The particularism here is striking. Whereas past US national security strategies spelled out a desire for Washington to spread liberal democracy throughout the world, Trump’s document says this is an unachievable goal. Instead, he seems to be interested primarily in the destiny of white Europeans – and in shaping their democracy and values to conform with his own.

The national security strategy warned that several countries risk becoming “non-European” due to migration, adding that if “present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognisable in 20 years or less”. This is a stance that some observers say echoes the racist “great replacement theory”, a comparison the White House has branded as “total nonsense”.

The third and final theme that stands out from the document is its intensely economic focus. The most detailed parts of the document relate to economic statecraft – how to reshore industries to the US, reshape the global trading system and enlist US allies in the mission of containing the economic rise of China.

Regional security matters, by contrast, receive much less attention. Russia’s ambitions in Europe are barely mentioned as a problem for the US, and Taiwan merits only a paragraph. Indeed, the Kremlin has said the new strategy is “largely consistent” with its vision.

Rarely has a US national security strategy been so transactional. In its discussion of why the US will support Taiwan, the document only invokes the island’s semiconductor industry and strategic position as reasons. Not a word is said about the intrinsic worth of Taiwanese democracy or the principle of non-aggression in international law.

The impression this leaves is that, in foreign policy, Trump prioritises economics over values. He views leaders such as China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin not as implacable dictators hell-bent on regional domination, but as possible business partners. He seems to believe the focus of foreign policy ought to be to maximise profits.

For US allies in Europe and Asia, this raises an uncomfortable question: what if the profitable thing to do turns out to be to abandon them and strike a grand bargain with Russia or China? Based on this document, they have little reason to think Trump will do anything else.

Andrew Gawthorpe is affiliated with the Foreign Policy Centre in London.