After a two-hour phone call with Russian leader Vladimir Putin on May 19, US president Donald Trump took to social media to declare that Russia and Ukraine will “immediately start negotiations” towards a ceasefire and an end to the war. He did, however, add that the conditions for peace “will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be”.
With the Vatican, according to Trump, “very interested in hosting the negotiations” and European leaders duly informed, it seems clear that the US has effectively abandoned its stalled mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
It was always a possibility that Trump could walk away from the war, despite previous claims he could end it in 24 hours. This only became more likely on May 16, when the first face-to-face negotiations between Ukraine and Russia for more than three years predictably ended without a ceasefire agreement.
When Trump announced shortly afterwards that he would be speaking to his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts by phone a few days later, he effectively mounted the beginning of a rearguard action. This was further underlined when, shortly before the Trump-Putin call, Vice-President J.D. Vance, explicitly told reporters that the US could end its shuttle diplomacy.
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The meagre outcomes of the talks between Russia and Ukraine – as well as between Trump and Putin – are not surprising. Russia is clearly not ready for any concessions yet. It keeps insisting that Ukraine accept its maximalist demands of territorial concessions and future neutrality.
Putin also continues to slow-walk any negotiations. After his call with Trump, he reportedly said that “Russia will offer and is ready to work with Ukraine on a memorandum on a possible future peace agreement”, including “a possible ceasefire for a certain period of time, should relevant agreements be reached.”
The lack of urgency on Russia’s part to end the fighting and, in fact, the Kremlin’s ability and willingness to continue the war was emphasised the day before the Trump-Putin call. Russia carried out its largest drone attack against Ukraine so far in the war, targeting several regions including Kyiv.
There has been no let-up in the fighting since. And the fact that Putin spoke to Trump while visiting a music school in the southern Russian city of Sochi does not suggest that a ceasefire in Ukraine is high on the Russian leader’s priority list.
A large part of the Kremlin’s calculation seems to be its desire to strike a grand bargain with the White House on a broader reset of relations between the US and Russia. It is signalling clearly that this is more important than the war in Ukraine and might even happen without the fighting there ending.
This also appears to be driving thinking in Washington. Trump foreshadowed an improvement in bilateral relations by describing the “tone and spirit” of his conversation with Putin as “excellent”. He also seemed pleased about the prospects of “large-scale trade” with Russia.
Abandoning European allies
Trump is on record as saying that there would be no progress towards peace in Ukraine until he and Putin get together. But it is worth bearing mind that very little movement towards a ceasefire in Ukraine – let alone a peace agreement – occurred after the last phone call between the two presidents in February.
Part of this lack of progress has been Trump’s reluctance to put any real pressure on Putin. And despite agreement in Brussels and preparations in Washington for an escalation in sanctions against Russia, it is unlikely that Trump will change his approach.
In this context, the sequence in which the calls occurred is telling. Trump and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, had a short call before the former spoke with Putin. Zelensky said he told Trump not to make decisions about Ukraine “without us”.
But rather than presenting Putin with a clear ultimatum to accept a ceasefire, Trump apparently discussed future relations with Putin at great length before informing Zelensky and key European allies that the war in Ukraine is now solely their problem to solve.
This has certainly raised justifiable fears in Kyiv and European capitals that, for the sake of a reset with Russia, the US might yet completely abandon its allies across the Atlantic.
However, if a reset with Russia at any cost really is Trump’s strategy, it is bound to fail. As much as Putin seems willing to continue with his aggression against Ukraine, Zelensky is as unwilling to surrender. Putin can rely on China’s continued backing while Zelensky can count on support from Europe.
Supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine is essential for China to keep Moscow on side in its rivalry with the US. And for Europe, supporting Ukraine has become an existential question of deterring and containing a revisionist Russia hell-bent on restoring a Soviet-style sphere of influence in central and eastern Europe.
In a world that has been in flux since Trump’s return to the White House, these are some of the emerging constants. And they make a US-Russia reset highly improbable.
Even if it were to happen, it would not strengthen Washington’s position with Beijing. Walking away from Ukraine and Europe now will deprive the US of the very allies it will need in the long term to prevail in its rivalry with China.
By abandoning his mediation between Moscow and Kyiv, Trump may have broken the deadlock in his efforts to achieve a reset with Russia. But getting this deal over the line will be a pyrrhic victory.
Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.
