How Russia is intercepting communications from European satellites

Officials recently sounded the alarm over Russia intercepting communications from European satellites. But this isn’t a new problem.

Ever since the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, two Russian satellites have been secretly stalking European spacecraft. They have been manoeuvring close enough to raise concerns about more than mere observation.

In 2018, the French defence minister accused Russia of espionage after one of these vehicles was spotted in the vicinity of a Franco-Italian military communications satellite. Two Intelsat satellites were similarly targeted before that.

These so-called proximity and rendezvous operations (RPOs), in which a spacecraft deliberately manoeuvres to dock or operate near another object in space, are becoming commonplace in geostationary orbit (GEO), where satellites effectively stay fixed over the same spot on Earth.

RPOs are not inherently malicious. These operations can sometimes be used to refuel a satellite and extend its lifespan, or to remove defunct satellites and debris, keeping orbits clear for future missions.

Because the technology to improve satellite manoeuvrability is dual use – it has both civilian and military applications – the challenge is then to define intent and, if required, respond accordingly.

Satellite inspections

Launched in 2014 and 2023, the two highly secretive Russian “inspector” satellites, Luch/Olymp 1 and 2, are part of Russia’s efforts to identify any technical vulnerabilities embedded in Nato countries’ satellites.

If this had been their sole purpose, European officials would have had few grounds for serious concern or complaint. Approaching a satellite to characterise its profile is neither a new mission nor exclusive to Russia.

The US Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) inspection satellites have come as close as ten kilometres of other satellites in the past. Even commercial companies have begun to provide inspection services.

An Australian company called HEO recently flew by a classified Chinese satellite to uncover its technical features. In theory, information like this could be used in the future to disrupt the functioning of satellites.

However, the Russian satellites have often shadowed the same spacecraft for months, occasionally approaching within five kilometres of their targets. This does not fit the mission profile of satellite inspection, which would involve merely passing by a target, taking pictures and quickly moving on to another trajectory.

GSSAP satellites, for example, typically work in pairs, adopting a pincer-like approach: one satellite orbits above GEO, inspecting the back of a target satellite, while the other moves just below, surveying its front.

Luch satellites by contrast are essentially signals intelligence (Sigint) systems. By positioning them between a target satellite and its ground station, Russia can intercept the signal and eavesdrop on communications from European satellites such as those operated by Eutelsat, a French company, and Intelsat, a Luxembourgish-American company. Among other customers, these European satellites provide bandwidth to European militaries for secure communications.

Examined in isolation, these Luch vehicles should be viewed as surveillance satellites rather than counterspace weapons – which are satellites that can actually disrupt or disable another spacecraft. The Russian satellites are simply collecting information. On this basis alone, they do not pose a significant security threat.

However, space as a domain remains entangled with broader geopolitical dynamics on Earth. Any Russian space operation should be seen as part of a larger campaign to accrue strategic benefits, whether to gain a military advantage over Ukraine or to coerce European countries into withdrawing their support for Ukraine.

Future threat

From this perspective, the Luch RPOs could be interpreted not only as part of a Sigint effort, but also as a warning to European countries that their satellites are vulnerable to disruption.

As Major General Michael Traut, commander of Germany’s Space Command has noted, the Luch satellites have also likely intercepted the command links of their targets. The command links are supposedly secure transmissions from ground stations to satellites that convey operational instructions.

If this is true, Russia could potentially replicate the uplink signals used by ground stations to control satellites, allowing them to disrupt European space operations in the future.

If this sounds familiar, it is because the scenario would closely mirror Russia’s hybrid campaign against European undersea cables. This has included years of covertly mapping western infrastructure and, more recently, a sustained effort to sever fibre optic cables.

The RPOs conducted over the last few years by the two Luch satellites could be suggestive of more escalatory moves in the future should Russia continue to fail in deterring Europe from continuing its support for Ukraine.

What can Europe do, in this scenario? A first welcome step has been the release of public information exposing Russia’s activities in geostationary orbit. In the past, space operations were generally concealed under a veil of secrecy.

More transparency can be leveraged to delegitimise these activities in the eyes of the international community whilst also legitimising the development of Europe’s own counterspace programmes for self defence.

Indeed, European countries including the UK and Germany have been much more vocal about the requirement to deploy their own counterspace systems. Russia has demonstrated other in-orbit capabilities that use RPOs and can be employed as counterspace weapons.

Without a comprehensive toolbox that includes self-defence options, Europe may be exposed to more escalatory in-space activities for which it is not adequately prepared.

Safeguarding its dependence on space-enabled services, from military communications to economic connectivity, therefore requires treating orbital security as an integral component of its broader strategic posture.

Aleix Nadal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.